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a b  s  t  r  a  c  t 
Recently a shift has occurred in the way in which the United States Forest Service (USFS) distributes funds to 
states through its State and Private Forestry (S&PF) program. Traditionally S&PF has distributed money to 
states and territories formulaically. Now, under the 2008 Redesign Initiative, 15% of these funds are allocated 
through a competitive process. In this paper we analyze this initiative through the lens of institutional 
economics. 
Using budget, interview and survey data, we evaluate the new allocation process on  the criteria  of 
allocative efficiency, transaction costs, and distributional effects. Additionally, we examine a trade-off 
the Redesign Initiative faces between short-term innovations and funding programs that meet long-term 
USFS goals. We conclude that, while there is some positive evidence that the program is achieving some 
of its stated goals, it is doing so at the expense of higher transaction costs and less certain long-term pro- 
jects. Moreover, we find that the lack of procedures to evaluate competitively funded projects is an impor- 
tant flaw that may prevent the new initiative from helping to create a high performing and adaptive 
governance system. 
1. Introduction
Forests provide numerous private as well as public benefits. Di- 
rect benefits to users include the provision of timber, fuelwood, 
charcoal, and habitat for culturally or economically important spe- 
cies. Broader social benefits include soil conservation, environmen- 
tal recreation, biodiversity preservation, regulation of run-off, and 
carbon sequestration (see Pearce, 2002). As such, conserving for- 
ests is a primary environmental objective for many government 
agencies in the United States and around the world. 
In the United States, 500 million acres of forestland, or roughly 
two-thirds of the national total, are owned by an entity other than 
the federal government. The State and Private Forestry (S&PF) pro- 
grams of the USDA Forest Service (USFS) have historically played an 
important role in the conservation and management of these lands 
by providing technical and financial assistance to states and terri- 
tories. It is primarily through state forestry agencies that federal in- 
vestment in state and private forests is channeled. Traditionally, 
S&PF has distributed funds formulaically to states and territories 
through a set of program areas including Forest Stewardship, 
Urban and Community Forestry, Forest Health Management, and 
State Fire Assistance.1
This paper examines recent changes in the delivery of USFS S&PF 
programs as legislated by the 2008 Farm Bill. These changes, known 
as “State and Private Forestry Redesign” (http://www.fs.fed.us/spf/ 
redesign/index.shtml), were first introduced in federal fiscal year 
2008 (FY2008). While there are several structural changes in the 
S&PF organization as the result of the Redesign Initiative, the focus 
of this paper is on one component: the introduction of competition 
into the allocation of federal funding to U.S. states and territories. 
15% of the formula funds are now distributed to states and territories 
through regional competitions. The remaining 85% of the S&PF budget 
is still dispersed to states and territories by formula. The original in- 
tent of the Redesign Initiative was to bring more than 15% of the 
formula-based funds into the competitive process in the future, al- 
though this has not yet occurred. 
The Redesign Initiative is being conducted jointly by the USFS, the 
National Association of State Foresters (NASF), and three regionally- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
based state forester associations: (1) the Western Forestry Leadership 
Coalition (WFLC),2 (2) the Southern Group of State Foresters (SGSF), 
and (3) the Northeastern Area Association of State Foresters (NAASF). 
Every U.S. state and territory is administratively located within one of 
these three regions, and each region runs its own competitive pro- 
cess. Fig. 1 presents the structure of federal grant allocations for 
S&PF following the implementation of the Redesign Initiative. 
In each region, there is a committee composed of state and federal 
representatives which annually receives and evaluates proposals sub- 
mitted by individual states/territories or multi-partner groups from 
that region. The Redesign Initiative has introduced three national 
themes as a means of categorizing and prioritizing funded activities. 
These themes are: (1) conserving working forest landscapes; (2) protect 
forests from harm; and (3) enhance public benefits associated with trees 
and forests. Additionally, funding decisions are to be based on the prior- 
ities expressed in Statewide Forest Resource Assessments and Strate- 
gies, another component of the Redesign Initiative to be produced by 
the states and territories themselves. The 2008 Farm Bill codified these 
two goals of the Redesign Initiative into law by amending the Coopera- 
tive Forestry Assistance Act. These two components are complemented 
by a National Assessment designed to mutually inform and be informed 
by the state-level assessments (USFS, 2007). 
To help evaluate these outcomes in a sample of competitively 
funded projects, the Redesign Initiative provides for the publication 
of an Annual Report Card. Additionally, in 2009 a web-based data col- 
lection tool was added to the USFS S&PF National Information Center 
(NIC), which allows for states to upload descriptions and summaries 
of their ongoing projects. While the implementation of the Redesign 
Initiative is ongoing, currently these are the two components that 
provide for the measurement and reporting of project outcomes. 
Together these components are designed to spur innovation in the 
construction of new types of projects geared towards regional de- 
mands that are not being addressed by the current formula-funded 
programs. Additionally, projects should represent an increase in col- 
laboration both between states and between states and other organi- 
zations, such as non-profits or Native American tribes. 
The goal of this research is to use the perspective of institutional 
economics to better understand the impacts thus far of the competi- 
tive resource allocation on the delivery of S&PF programs across the 
United States. We begin with a review of the relevant theory and em- 
pirical work. This is then followed by a description of our methods 
and results, and a brief conclusion. 
 
2. Background 
 
2.1. Theoretical Justification and Background 
 
The Redesign Initiative represents a partial devolution of authority 
from the national level to the state and regional levels. As such it re- 
flects increasingly popular notions of competition, innovation, ac- 
countability and transparency in government, which have become a 
strong and standard part of political rhetoric and policy dialog in 
the U.S. For example, the 2001 President's Management Agenda, 
which emphasized competition in funding allocations, motivated 
this by stating a need for a government that is “Market-based, actively 
promoting rather than stifling innovation through competition.” In 
our experience, these concepts, at least with respect to the motivation 
for the Redesign program, have also become persuasive within the 
United States Congress, to which the USFS ultimately has to justify 
its expenditures. 
In this section we present a potential theoretical motivation for 
the introduction of competition into the S&PF funding process. We 
 
 
2 
Unique among the regional state forester organizations, the WFLC is composed of 
both State Forester and federal (USFS Regional Foresters and USFS Research Station Di- 
rectors) members. 
are not claiming that the change was implemented with these specific 
arguments in mind, and our impression, based on our interviews and 
a reading of the Redesign primary literature, is that the motivation for 
the process had not been as thoroughly spelled out. Nevertheless, 
here we present some previous work with which the new funding ap- 
proach is consonant, in large part to illustrate the motivation for our 
own research. 
There are several theoretical motivations for the devolution em- 
bodied by Redesign. To begin, the traditional formula-based system 
partially represents a common potential weakness of centralized gov- 
ernments: an inability to recognize local heterogeneity, which leads 
to the application of a common policy to a diversity of contexts for 
which it is poorly  suited (Scott, 1998). The problem that Scott 
(1998) discusses results in large part because centralized govern- 
ments often have too little information to govern effectively. This is 
an established source of government failure which is discussed fre- 
quently in the literature on public choice (Tullock, 2002). 
This situation for centralized governments is commonly contrasted 
with that of a market, where, among other things, it is presumed that 
consumers have perfect information that enables them to purchase 
goods from producers that maximize their welfare. Moreover, market 
competition gives incentive producers to provide the goods that con- 
sumers desire. This has led to the popular notion that under certain con- 
ditions, using market-based competition to provide for and distribute 
economic goods can maximize allocative efficiency. While allocative ef- 
ficiency has a rather precise definition in microeconomics, here we use 
the more general meaning, which is the allocation of scarce resources to 
their most valuable use. In the private goods markets of standard theo- 
ry, this value is determined by the consumers who purchase the goods. 
The literature on fiscal federalism has made a similar argument, 
this being that, in the absence of spatial externalities and economies 
of scale, states may have a comparative advantage over a national 
government  in  matching  the  provision  of  public  goods  to  local 
demands, thereby increasing the efficiency of public expenditures. 
“By tailoring outputs of such goods and services to the particular pref- 
erences and circumstances of their constituencies, decentralized pro- 
vision increases economic welfare above that which results from the 
more uniform levels of such services that are likely under national 
provision” (Oates, 1999, 1121–1122). In both cases the argument 
for decentralization rests on the notion of increased allocative effi- 
ciency by a better reflection of localized preferences. 
Much of the motivation for the Redesign Initiative is, at least implic- 
itly, based on these arguments. The proposal writing process acts to so- 
licit the preferences of the states, which should be best able to reflect 
their own needs because of their low-cost access to local information. 
Then, the proposal review process in some ways mimics a market com- 
petition, where the states act as producers and the review committees 
act as consumers. With enough information, the review committees 
may be able to increase efficiency in the same way that perfectly in- 
formed consumers do so in a private goods market. This information 
could come from two sources: firstly, from the reviewers own knowl- 
edge and experience of the states whose proposals they are reviewing; 
secondly, from the Statewide Forest Resource Assessments and Strate- 
gies mentioned earlier, which are produced by the states and territories 
themselves. Finally, as long as there is enough competition, the states 
will be incentivized to produce the public goods that perform well in 
the selection process. 
This narrative becomes more complicated if we understand the re- 
lationship between a grantor and a grantee as a principal–agent rela- 
tionship (Eisenhardt, 1989). In a principal–agent relationship (PAR), 
an agent acts on behalf of a principal. This relationship focuses on 
the challenges of motivating the agent to act on behalf of the principal 
when interests of both parties are not perfectly aligned and the prin- 
cipal has imperfect information on the actions of the agent. A com- 
mon example of a PAR would be the relationship between an 
employer (principal) and an employee (agent). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The current structure of federal grant allocations under the redesigned S&PF program. 
 
The main PAR that we will focus on is the relationship between the 
regional evaluation committees as the funders (principals) and the 
funded states and territories (agents). The states are acting on behalf 
of those who are paying them to provide an important public service. 
PARs existed in the formula-based process prior to the Redesign Initia- 
tive, primarily between the states and the USFS Washington D.C. office. 
There is anecdotal evidence that the formula-based system itself has not 
addressed the PAR issues it faces. However, because a major motivation 
for the competitive mechanism is to increase agent accountability in 
comparison to the formula system, we believe that there is more of an 
onus on the new process to address these issues. 
Institutional arrangements can ameliorate problems associated 
with PARs by providing incentives and/or information. Unfortunately, 
doing so incurs transaction costs. Transaction costs have been defined 
as “the costs of measuring and enforcing agreements” (North, 1990, 
362), although here we also include the initial formation of agree- 
ments. High transaction costs can inhibit the formation of such agree- 
ments, and thus pose challenges for environmental governance 
(Paavola and Adger, 2005). Transaction costs are difficult to measure 
empirically. Nevertheless, they can be usefully applied on a compara- 
tive basis in order to analyze the implications of various governance 
and contractual arrangements (Williamson, 1985, 22). 
In an environmental governance and policymaking context, we 
can identify types of transaction costs that are likely to be incurred 
at various stages of governance. These include costs of: (1) research; 
(2) enactment; (3) design and implementation; (4) support and ad- 
ministration; (5) contracting; (6) monitoring; and (7) enforcement 
(Coggan et al., 2010; McCann et al., 2005). Much of these costs are in- 
curred during the initial development of a policy, while others are on- 
going. In this analysis we will focus on the ongoing transaction costs 
of the competitive process. 
 
 
2.2. Previous Empirical and Theoretical Work 
 
This section describes some relevant theoretical (model-based) and 
empirical work that has applied these concepts to the evaluation of 
competitive  funding  mechanisms.  Most  of  the  literature  that  has 
examined competitive funding mechanisms in comparison to formula- 
funding mechanisms has done so in the agricultural research and devel- 
opment sector. Within the United States, this sector has already gone 
through a transition from a formula-based funding regime to one that 
also includes competition-based funding mechanisms. This shift reflects 
an international trend (Vera-Cruz et al., 2008). In this section we discuss 
findings from the U.S. experience as well as from the international 
literature. 
There are five primary findings from the applied literature that we 
reviewed regarding competitive programs. First, they can increase 
transaction costs, primarily because of proposal preparation and peer 
review processes (Huffmann and Just, 1994, 1999, 2000; Janssen, 1998). 
Second, there is mixed evidence regarding their effects on allocative 
efficiency. In a review of Latin American funding regimes, Echeverria 
(1998, 1108) gives a brief evaluation of competitive funding programs: 
“To date, they have proven to be efficient mechanisms for funding re- 
search by providing greater accountability to the funding source.” Addi- 
tionally, Janssen (1998, 143) states that under competitive allocation 
processes, “financiers themselves come under increasing pressure of ac- 
countability. Although they may believe in the relevance of the research 
programs, the need to demonstrate concrete results may lead them to 
fund specific activities and to share explicitly in the credit for the out- 
puts.” However, Huffmann and Just (2000) argue that competitive 
mechanisms can in fact be less efficient than a formula system given 
the limited information grant proposal reviewers may have about the 
value of the projects that would ultimately be funded. Without this in- 
formation, proposal reviewers cannot maximize social value by selecting 
the best proposals. 
Third, competitive programs tend to foster projects with short time 
horizons (Huffmann and Just, 1994, 1999; Janssen, 1998). Fourth, partly 
because of this, they may be inappropriate for long-term projects with 
uncertain outcomes (Byerlee, 1998; Huffmann and Evenson, 2006; 
Vera-Cruz et al., 2008). Huffmann and Evenson (2006, 785), for exam- 
ple, point out that the properties of basic research as a public good 
favor a formulaic funding mechanism: “Many important scientific dis- 
coveries take more than a decade to achieve. Hence, if scientists must 
pursue extramural funding, they face a large amount of uncertainty” 
which is moderated by a consistent source of formula-based funding. 
 
 
This situation is suboptimal from the perspective of the grantor as well: 
long-term and uncertain outcomes, such as those sought for by R&D ac- 
tivities, exacerbate the information asymmetry associated with the PAR 
because reviewers cannot easily connect outcomes to the efforts of the 
funded agencies, their principals. This indicates that, as the production 
of the outcome by the grantee becomes increasingly uncertain, 
formula-based funding and associated long-term relationships between 
grantors and grantees may be more effective at securing these 
outcomes. 
Finally, in their analysis of the agricultural R&D competitive grants 
program of the USDA, Rubenstein et al. (2003) find that competitive 
grants tend to fund more basic biological and technological research, 
and that competitive grant funds are more highly concentrated 
among fewer states. Competitive grants may thus have implications 
for equity, which is a general concern with market-based competi- 
tion. However, because competitive programs to that point com- 
prised only 15% of USDA funding to states for agricultural R&D, 
Rubenstein et al. (2003) conclude that these trends did not translate 
into large distributional effects. 
 
3. Methods 
 
3.1. Hypotheses 
 
Based on this previous empirical and theoretical work, we can de- 
rive several questions to ask of the Redesign Initiative. We will ex- 
plore these questions through the following hypotheses: 
 
1. The competitive process will require an increased degree of ac- 
countability on the part of states, and therefore be allocatively ef- 
ficient compared to the formula-based system. 
2. The competitive process will incur more transaction costs than the 
formula-based system. 
3. The competitive process will produce a change in the distribution 
of funds across states. 
4. The competitive process will face a trade-off between producing 
innovative projects and assuring the accomplishment of long- 
term goals. 
 
The first hypothesis derives primarily from the traditional eco- 
nomic justification for market-based competition. A well functioning 
competitive process ought to be able to increase the accountability of 
those providing the goods to the “consumers,” in this case the funding 
committees, which should in turn facilitate an increase in allocative 
efficiency as highly performing projects are funded. The second hy- 
pothesis reflects the finding that in providing the information needed 
to achieve such allocative efficiency, additional transaction costs will 
be incurred. The third hypothesis reflects empirical work that has 
found, not surprisingly, that competitive funding mechanisms distrib- 
ute resources differently than do formula-based mechanisms. 
The fourth hypothesis again draws from the empirical literature 
(Huffmann and Evenson, 2006) that has emphasized the compara- 
tively poor performance of competitive funding mechanisms in se- 
curing funds for projects with uncertain outcomes and long time 
horizons. Given that the objective of the Redesign Initiative is to in- 
crease levels of innovation and satisfy the three rather broad themes 
mentioned earlier, it seems likely that many of the competitively 
funded projects belong in this category. Therefore, we hypothesize 
that the innovation obtained through the competitive process will 
come at the cost of achieving long-term and uncertain objectives. 
 
3.2. Data Collection and Analysis 
 
We collected three types of data to address our hypotheses: 
(1) regional budget and grant proposal data; (2) data from interviews 
with state, regional and national informants; and (3) responses to an 
online survey we sent to each state and territory forestry agency regard- 
ing their experiences with the competitive funding process. 
The goal of the budget data analysis was to examine the distribu- 
tional effects of the competitive funding mechanism across states and 
territories. Budget data were obtained from each regional USFS office. 
The budget data included records of 2005–2008 core funding (funding 
distributed by formula) by program area for each state/territory, and 
competitive funding budget data for the years 2008–2010 for all states 
and territories. Core data for the period 2009–2010 involved reconciling 
data sources that proved too incompatible for use in this analysis. 
Within each geographic region, competitive funding was directly 
compared to core funding at the state level for 2008, the only year 
for which core and competitive budget data were made available for 
all three regions. For each state and territory, we computed a ratio 
of the amount of funds received in competition vs. the amount of 
funds received in core, each as a percentage of the total amounts allo- 
cated to that state or territory's region. 
This was calculated as: 
 
 
 
 
 
In the numerator and the denominator we divide by the amount 
allocated to a state or territory's region to correct for slight differences 
across the three regions in the ratio of the amounts available for core 
vs. competitive funding. This produces a variable that has some intu- 
itive properties. A ratio of one indicates that a state received the same 
shares of its region's competitive funds and the region's core funds, 
and is essentially breaking even with the program change. States 
with ratios higher than one are obtaining a higher share of regionally 
available competitive funds than they had of the core funds, and are 
thus benefiting from the competitive process. 
In addition to collecting budget data, we conducted a total of 12 
semi-structured phone interviews, which included interviews with 
top officials from each USFS region, the regional state forester organi- 
zations, and the NASF. These interviewees served as “key informants”, 
and as such were selected based on their professional involvement 
with, and therefore presumed knowledge of, the Redesign Initiative 
(Love, 2004). In addition, several interviewees were selected through 
a process of snowball sampling. 
To complement and validate the interview data, we conducted an 
online survey that was distributed to the forestry agency office of 
every U.S. State and territory. We obtained a total of 42 responses to 
the online survey, which accounted for two-thirds of the total number 
of U.S. state and territory forestry agencies to which it was sent. In dis- 
tributing the survey, we asked the head of each forestry agency to either 
respond to the survey personally, or to delegate it to someone whom 
they felt had the necessary experience to accurately represent the expe- 
riences of their state or territory in the competitive process. Both the in- 
terviews and the survey focused on the experiences that relevant actors 
had had with the competitive process, particularly along the dimen- 
sions that were most relevant to our hypotheses. 
To analyze the survey data, we first coded and classified responses 
to the open-ended questions so that we could characterize them 
quantitatively (see Neuendorf, 2002). Following this, we calculated 
basic descriptive statistics for each of the questions from the survey, 
obtaining quantitative summaries of the experiences of the respon- 
dents. With this we were able to characterize the broad patterns of 
experiences  among  the  respondents,  and  search  for  experiences 
 
 
State Ratio ¼ ½State Competitive Money=Regional Competitive Money  
½State Core Money=Regional Core Money : 
 
 
 
more specific to subgroups of respondents. We evaluated the inter- 
view data qualitatively, primarily using it as a way to validate the sur- 
vey data (see Yin, 1994). 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Allocative Efficiency 
 
To most thoroughly address the question of allocative efficiency, 
we would need to include a discussion of whether the stated goals 
of the Redesign projects are in fact directed at the best use of scarce re- 
sources. In this analysis, we take the value of these goals for granted, 
and ask whether or not they are effectively being reached. To remind 
the reader, the goals of the Redesign Initiative are: (1) increase collabo- 
ration, (2) increase innovation, (3) address the three national themes, 
and (4) address the goals stated in the State Assessments and Strategies. 
Addressing the goals in turn requires that the PAR is addressed in the 
proposal review process. 
To begin, the Redesign Initiative is making steps towards increas- 
ing collaboration. Two-thirds of survey respondents reported in- 
creased collaboration, 12% reported a decrease, and 21% reported no 
change. In an open-ended question where survey respondents were 
asked to discuss the main advantages of the competitive process, col- 
laboration (40%) was the most frequently identified response. Re- 
spondents reported that the majority of this collaboration occurred 
between states (as opposed to collaboration with non-governmental 
entities). 
While this is a positive result, several respondents commented 
that much of this collaboration occurred during proposal preparation 
rather than during project implementation, which is the goal of the 
Redesign Initiative. Additionally, budget data and proposal document 
analysis revealed that for 2008 and 2009, most successful competitive 
projects were undertaken by only a single state. 
Finally, there may be a built in tension between the competitive 
process and the goal of facilitating collaboration. If the states collabo- 
rate too much this could undermine the competitive process. At the 
extreme this would be referred to as collusion rather than collabora- 
tion. This is one of several built-in tensions between the competitive 
process and the goals it is designed to achieve. 
Moving on, the Redesign Initiative seems to be meeting its goal of 
encouraging the innovation of new kinds of projects. When asked 
about the effects of the process on the innovation of new and impor- 
tant projects, two thirds of the survey respondents reported an in- 
crease in innovation, while 14% reported a decrease. Additionally, 
when asked an open-ended question about the advantages of the pro- 
cess, innovation was the second most common response (29%) after 
collaboration. 
Regarding the three national themes, there was a general view 
among the survey respondents from the West (81% of western states) 
and Northeast (69%) regions that they were being favored in the pro- 
cess. In particular, in one of the open-ended questions, respondents 
highlighted the importance of the process in accomplishing a sub- 
objective of one of the themes — “identify and conserve high priority 
forest ecosystems and landscapes.” However, in the South, only 3 out 
of the 10 respondents felt that the three themes were being achieved, 
and an interviewee from the southern region of the Forest Service 
claimed the themes were too broad in nature to be meaningfully uti- 
lized in evaluation. 
The extent to which State Assessments and Strategies have been 
addressed in the competitive resource allocation is unclear given 
that states and territories did not complete these documents until 
June 2010. Therefore substantive proposal evaluation using these 
documents was unlikely to occur until the 2011 funding cycle. For 
this reason, evaluation of this goal is difficult for the years addressed 
in this study. That being said, one regional administrator interviewed 
explained that little guidance had been offered from the federal level 
as to how State Assessments and Strategies should be utilized for 
evaluation of competitive proposals at the regional level. 
The results for of allocative efficiency remain unclear when we ask 
whether or not the PAR between the regional evaluation committees 
and the states is effectively being addressed. As discussed earlier, the 
states are agents of the regions, which provide them funds in order to 
produce important public goals. The most important way in which 
the Redesign Initiative is addressing this relationship and the poten- 
tial problems that may arise from it is through the competitive pro- 
posal review process run by each region. 
However, there are four problems that this process faces in ensur- 
ing accountability of the agents. First, given the breadth and diversity 
of the review criteria, as seen in the national themes, it is reasonable 
to ask how much room there may be for the dynamics and personal- 
ities of the review committees to affect funding decisions. Interper- 
sonal dynamics, as well as a potential quality of being highly risk- 
averse, could make it difficult for the review committees to act in 
favor of the goals of the Redesign Initiative and as a disciplining 
force on the states as agents. During our interviews with regional of- 
ficials we found that, while there are formalized processes for evalu- 
ating the proposals in each region, there is also room for interpersonal 
interactions to affect evaluations and outcomes. 
Secondly, there is a problem of a potential conflict of interest if a 
reviewer has a close relationship with the team that submitted a pro- 
posal. This is more likely to occur if a reviewer reviews a proposal 
from their own state or territory. As a result of this, it is generally a 
matter of policy for all three regions that reviewers are not allowed 
to review proposals submitted from their state or territory. While 
this seems to be a reasonable approach to this issue, it may exacer- 
bate the third problem by directing reviewers to evaluate proposal 
for states with which they are relatively unfamiliar. 
This third problem is that without some information about the 
needs of a particular state or group of states, the reviewers cannot ef- 
fectively evaluate state proposals. As stated earlier, this information 
can come from either (1) personal experience, or (2) State Assess- 
ments. As just discussed, the State Assessments were not produced 
by all states before 2010, and a primary purpose of these is to provide 
some of the information reviewers would need in order to establish a 
baseline for the evaluation of state needs. As an information provision 
device, however, this is imperfect. It is essentially depending on the 
agent in a PAR to tell the principal how the principal should evaluate 
the agent's performance. From a PAR perspective, at least, it may be 
desirable to have a third party involved in the production of the 
State Assessments. 
The fourth and, in our view, largest problem with this process is 
that it does not itself require that the states follow through with 
what they state they will do in their proposals. The review process 
is judging based on promises, not outputs. As such, the ability of 
this process to ensure accountability is relatively weak compared to 
a process that monitors the outputs of states with funded projects 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
With respect to this, the Redesign Initiative does provide for basic 
reporting of project activities from states to their federal funders, and 
most state survey respondents across the three regions indicated an- 
nual reporting of budget expenditures and project outcomes. The 
states generally make project progress reports available through the 
National Information Center (http://spfnic.fs.fed.us/redesign/index. 
cfm?fuseaction=public.default). These reports are qualitative sum- 
maries of projects, and contain a standard set of sections, including 
one entitled “Deliverables accomplished to date.” This section generally 
contains a relatively short summary of what has been done to accom- 
plish the objectives of a project. It is fair to say that these reports repre- 
sent some degree of self-reporting, but are non-quantitative and non- 
evaluative, emphasizing brief descriptions of what had been done, as 
opposed to how well it may had been done or with what outcomes. 
Additionally, this problem is similar to the issue just discussed, of relying 
 
 
on the states to provide information that will be used in evaluating state 
proposals through State Assessments: relying on agent self-reporting to 
resolve a PAR is inherently tricky and relies on high levels of trust, being 
analogous to having “the foxes guard the henhouse.” 
The other formal way that the Redesign Initiative provides for 
reviews of the competitively funded projects is through the annual Re- 
design Report Cards. Unfortunately, these do not seem to be providing 
detailed feedback regarding the performance of funded projects, and re- 
gional interviewees did not necessarily consider this the goal of the Re- 
port Cards. Just over half (55%) of the survey respondents reported that 
the Report Cards were not useful for any purpose, while only 12% 
reported that they were useful. When asked what the most important 
uses of the Report Cards were, only 19% indicated that they helped pro- 
vide a measure of accountability to the competitive process, which is 
the service they would need to provide to address the PAR problem be- 
tween funders and states. 
Interviews with regional administrators did reveal that competitively- 
funded projects are monitored in the same manner as core funding by 
program areas: by USFS regional program managers engaged with 
project- or program-specific and consolidated grants to the state agen- 
cies. However, these key informants also indicated that no formal evalu- 
ation of competitively-funded projects is undertaken by USFS program 
managers, or feeds into future competitive funding decisions. Given this 
context, the following quote from a survey respondent is worrisome: 
 
“Evaluator feedback is limited and weak. The feedback from the 
grant review has been limited and of limited help in improving fu- 
ture proposals. Follow-up lacking. No review or evaluation has been 
offered for grants that have been awarded. Useful follow-up could 
include: verifying that offers and claims made in proposals actually 
occur; evaluating if competitive grant accomplishments meet na- 
tional or regional needs; and assessing impact of re-directing 
funding from on-going programs to competitive grants.” 
 
The lack of a formal project evaluation mechanism that would 
feed into future funding decisions reveals that the Redesign Initiative 
is suffering from the traditional government failure of insufficient in- 
formation described earlier. This is critical for several reasons. First, it 
makes it difficult to know whether the competition is achieving its 
goals, and this lack of evaluative procedure is often mentioned as its 
own type of government failure. Secondly and more importantly, it 
gives us a reason to doubt that it is reaching these goals. Referring 
back to the discussion of market-based competition, the provision of 
allocative efficiency in a private goods market is entirely dependant 
on consumers having enough information about the good or service 
they are purchasing. In this case, the “consumer” is the granting com- 
mittee and the good or service is the outcome produced by each 
funded project. However, the committees cannot know the perfor- 
mance of a project before they decide to fund it. They only have ac- 
cess to the grant proposal, which does not necessarily correlate in 
quality to the eventual project and its outcomes. Competitive ar- 
rangements in such information — poor environments cannot guar- 
antee positive results. The worst case scenario could then be, as one 
survey respondent put it, that the primary accomplishment of the 
program would be to satisfy the potentially ideological need of the 
U.S. Congress for a competitive funding outlet. Or in the words of an- 
other respondent, the competitive mechanism might simply be 
selecting based on which states have the most talented grant-writers. 
 
 
4.2. Transaction Costs 
 
The results with respect to transaction costs are clear: the compet- 
itive process has increased them. Some of this is an inevitable result of 
the planning and initial implementation of a new policy. Because this 
is unavoidable for the implementation of any new policy, we do not 
count it against the Redesign Initiative. However, it is clear that ongo- 
ing costs have also increased. 
To begin to measure the changes in transaction costs, we start 
with data on the numbers of submitted and funded grants. Over the 
years 2008 and 2009, the percentage of submitted projects that re- 
ceived funding was 40% in the West, 35% in the Northeast, and 60% 
in the South. The South's percentage is slightly inflated because this 
region approved more projects in 2008 than it could fund for that 
year, committing itself to these projects for subsequent years. The 
overall funding percentage for 2008 and 2009 was 43%. There are 
two interpretations of these numbers. First, that the selection process 
has increased the average value of the funded projects. Second, that 
the unfunded projects represent an inefficiency in the form of trans- 
action costs borne with no direct benefit. 
Turning to the survey data, 81% of survey respondents stated that 
the process had increased their administrative costs, while only 2% indi- 
cated a decrease. The remainder reported no effect. The primary reason 
reported for the change was the increase in costs associated with the 
professional and support staff needed to write grant proposals. This re- 
sult was confirmed in an open-ended survey question that asked re- 
spondents to describe the greatest disadvantages of the process. The 
most frequent response (60%) described the rise in administrative 
costs incurred in proposal preparation. As one survey respondent stat- 
ed: “At some point we will need to look at our priorities and use of 
our time. We spend 80% of our time applying/managing/reporting for 
10% of our agency funds.” Transaction costs have also increased at the 
regional level, in the form of proposal reviews and grant management. 
Transaction costs seem not to have increased much as a result of 
monitoring and enforcement activities. However, the reason for this 
is that there is currently no rigorous project evaluation mechanism. 
This is certainly needed to make the initiative work, but it would fur- 
ther increase ongoing transaction costs. 
This confirms findings from previous work: the competitive pro- 
cess incurs more transaction costs than the formula-based process. 
In this paper we have kept the concept of allocative efficiency sepa- 
rate from our analysis of transaction costs. However, it is worth not- 
ing that an increase in transaction costs, in this case in the form of 
increased administrative costs, is some sense represents a decrease 
in allocative efficiency to many of the survey respondents: they do 
not see the resources of their agencies being directed towards their 
best use by the new competitive process. 
 
4.3. Equity and Distributional Effects 
 
Examining the distributional impacts of the Redesign Initiative with 
the ratio of competitive funds to core funds each state or territory re- 
ceived in 2008 revealed mixed results. Again, a ratio of one indicates 
that a state/territory essentially broke even in the competitive process, 
while higher values indicate greater competitive success. Fig. 2 shows 
that the distribution of this ratio with all states and territories included 
is positively skewed. Much of this skew results from the fact that the 
distribution has a lower bound at 0, leading more states to cluster 
near this value. There are a fair number of states with a ratio of 0, indi- 
cating a complete lack of competitive funds, although a number of these 
states did not compete in the first place. The number of states with ra- 
tios over 1 (24) is reasonably close to the number with ratios lower 
than 1 (30). Fig. 3 shows the distribution for each region. None of 
these distributions diverge much from the aggregate distribution. The 
West does have the most positive skew, and it is interesting that the 
southern distribution is somewhat bimodal, with no state breaking 
even. This indicates that the difference between the winners and losers 
may be more identifiable in the South. 
Turning to the survey, 69% of all states responded that they felt 
they had successfully competed for Redesign funds, although this per- 
centage decreased to only 50% in the south. Overall, there did not 
seem to be a strong sense among the respondents that the new 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Distribution of S&PF competitive/core fund ratios aggregated across all three 
regions. 
 
 
process was producing inequitable outcomes. Only 10% of respon- 
dents indentified inequity as a disadvantage of the competition. In 
part, this may be because of the existence of caps on both the number 
of projects and the amount of money that states could receive in one 
year through the competitive process. These caps, applied somewhat 
differently among regions, were generally viewed favorably by the re- 
spondents, who felt that they encouraged equitable outcomes with- 
out sacrificing the competitive nature of the process. 
Overall, while the competitive process has produced a different 
distribution of funds across the states, this was expected, and it is 
not the case that there are relatively few winners who are making 
large gains at the expense of many losers. However, we believe that 
this is partly a result of the fact that currently only 15% of the S&PF 
funds are distributed competitively. If this were to reach, for example, 
half of the total available funds, the outcomes of the competition 
would probably produce much greater concerns over equity. 
 
4.4. Innovation vs. Core Programs 
 
As mentioned earlier, the survey respondents were reasonably con- 
sistent in reporting an increase in innovation as a result of the Redesign 
Initiative. However, many respondents also expressed a concern over 
losing core program funds and the ability to maintain the provision of 
core programs in the face of the loss of core funding. Many states in 
each region are also concerned with the inability of the new process 
to fund long-term projects, which is really the staple of core program 
funding. One survey respondent summarized the problem: 
“Funding is less consistent or certain. The grant selection process 
appears to lend itself to funding unique innovative short term pro- 
grams that have a maximum three year lifespan, with some as- 
sumption that the capacity building within the program will 
carry it on if needed. Uncertainty exists whether a continuation 
of a good program would ever be selected for a future grant.” 
 
The Redesign Initiative funds competitively funded projects for up to 
three years. Long-term projects (more than three years) are difficult to 
run, because of the uncertainty of obtaining the needed funds year after 
year through a competitive process. Core funds likely cannot be used, as 
these are still devoted to core programs. It may be difficult to balance 
the two goals of innovation and long-term viability, although one sur- 
vey respondent indicated that they may be complementary: 
“Formula funds allow us to implement traditional programs and 
maintain capacity; competitive funds allow us to address emerg- 
ing issues that do not fall into the traditional stovepipes of formula 
funding, and allow us to increase capacity (albeit short term/soft 
money supported). Both are important.” 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Distribution of S&PF competitive/core fund ratios by region. 
 
 
 
 
Related to this trade-off, there is an inherent tension in funding 
projects with uncertain outcomes through competitive processes. As 
has also been noted in the funding of agricultural R&D, such uncer- 
tainty would favor a more formulaic funding mechanism to ensure a 
continuous stream of funds to breach the gap between the initiation 
of a project and the eventual production of a public good. Given 
that the competitively funded projects are supposed to be innovative, 
and that with such experimentation comes much uncertainty, we be- 
lieve that the same problem presents itself in the implementation Re- 
design Initiative. This problem has not yet been addressed. 
One survey respondent made the following suggestion that inno- 
vation could be produced by a formula-based system, which could re- 
move this tension, and potentially lower transaction costs: 
“Bring funding back to the formula driven process. Utilize the existing 
formula driven process with the caveat that each state provides pro- 
ject information on use of the 15% of program funds. These projects 
must be innovations based on defined state forest assessment strate- 
gies. This can greatly reduce the additional administrative and staff 
costs that are inherent in the current competitive process and still 
maintain the innovative and state to state efforts.” 
This comment highlights a degree of independence between the 
competitive resource allocation mechanism and the stated goals of 
the Redesign Initiative. It is possible that the goals could have been 
reached as well or better by making changes within a formula- 
based system, although this would face some of the same problems. 
Using a process of competition for funds is certainly one way to ad- 
dress the goals of the Redesign Initiative and to tackle the problem 
of government failure through insufficient information as discussed 
earlier, but it is not the only way. 
Meanwhile, within the U.S. agricultural R&D sector, the potential 
problems for long-term viability (and equity) associated with a com- 
petitive allocation mechanism have been mitigated because the com- 
petitively allocated funds only account for 15% of the total funds 
provided. The same is currently the case for the Redesign funds. As 
such, the question becomes, what level of competitively allocated 
funds strikes the right balance? When asked what the impact of an in- 
crease from the current 15% allocated competitively, the survey re- 
spondents were overwhelmingly negative, and indicated that it 
should not increase further. There was more consensus on this 
point than on any other issue addressed by the survey respondents. 
5. Conclusions
The results of the Redesign Initiative so far are as follows: (1) im- 
provements in allocative efficiency are possible but questionable; 
(2) transaction costs have increased; (3) equity is currently not a 
large issue, but would likely become one if more funds were distrib- 
uted competitively; and (4) there is an important trade-off between 
the innovation produced by the competition and the provision of 
long-term public goods. We now conclude our analysis with three 
recommendations and a brief discussion of future research. 
First, we recommend that the performance of each competitively 
funded project should be monitored and recorded by a party other 
than the state or territory conducting the project, so that these evalu- 
ations can become an important part of future funding decisions. If 
poor performance on a past project has no consequences for the abil- 
ity to obtain money on future proposals, then there is no incentive for 
the states to be accountable by producing high quality projects. In this 
case the Redesign Initiative becomes primarily about a new emphasis 
on the three national themes and the talents of states' grant writers. 
This recommendation comes with two caveats. First, we need to rec- 
ognize that further implementation of the Redesign Initiative, and the 
formal or informal reputation-building that can come along with this, 
may begin to address this issue. At the same time, Huffmann and Just 
(2000), in their analysis of the principal–agent problem associated 
with the USDA's competitive grants program for agricultural research, 
give an indication that this is not a very easy problem to solve, even 
with more time for implementation. The second caveat is that a stron- 
ger evaluative process would further increase the transaction costs in- 
volved in the Redesign Initiative. 
Secondly, there is currently no mechanism to incorporate success- 
ful competitively funded projects into a long-term view of the goals 
the state forest agencies. Without this, the Redesign Initiative is facil- 
itating experimentation without long-term learning and adaptation. 
We would recommend that such a mechanism be implemented so 
that the projects that are deemed to be highly successful can be incor- 
porated into long-term activities of forestry agencies. 
Finally, many survey respondents expressed concern that the new 
projects would come at the cost of their agencies' capacities to maintain 
core programs. If much more than 15% of the funds are eventually dis- 
tributed through competitive means, the trade-off between innovation 
and stability will be exacerbated, and there may be a severe trade-off 
between allocative efficiency and equity. Greater competition also 
raises transaction costs. As such, while we do see some positive results 
in our analysis, we would recommend that there be little or no short- 
term increase in the percentage of funds that are distributed through 
the Redesign Initiative's competition. 
In future research we plan to develop a more longitudinal ap- 
proach to this analysis, which will be increasingly possible as the Re- 
design Initiative continues to be implemented. A second survey of 
state Forestry agencies is planned in the next few years. In addition 
to this, we plan to conduct several case studies of states that have 
been particularly successful (and unsuccessful) in the competitive 
process. Using the data gained from these future activities, we will 
be able to re-evaluate the performance of the new program based 
on the criteria that we have discussed in this paper. 
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